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If a Marine was asked on the first day of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) , what the greatest threat confronting him was, it is unlikely he would have said the improvised explosive device (IED). However, the IED has accounted for 41% of all deaths or 1,594 US service-member deaths, making it the number one source of casualties. 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
The term MRAP refers to a family of fighting vehicles designed with a V-hull and raised chassis to withstand an IED The problem is the vehicles are not common across manufacturers. All MRAP vehicles will have common tires, drive trains, government furnished equipment, and one of two engines.
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While commonality of parts is characteristic of the largest items, the frame and other components are not common. Differing frames and other parts between vendors will require eight different parts blocks. Since the MRAP will mostly serve as a complementary capability to the HMMWV, these new parts blocks will be in addition to those already existing.
Increased fuel requirement for heavily armored vehicles is another problem. MRAPs, which burn nearly three times as much fuel as a HMMWV, will increase fuel costs and the amount of fuel sustainment operations necessary to sustain the armored force. The Marine Corps must limit its acquisition and use of MRAPs because of the prohibitive cost.
Lack of Mobility
The counterinsurgency in Iraq is largely in urban areas.
Due to the urbanization of society it is likely that battlefields of tomorrow will also be fought in urban terrain.
There are several reasons that MRAP is not well suited for this environment.
Urban terrain in underdeveloped nations like Iraq have characteristically poor infrastructure, requiring vehicles with good mobility characteristics. Roads are often narrow with little room to maneuver. The MRAP is unable to traverse some of the same urban streets where the HMMWV once could. As an example of its limited mobility, during a recent visit to Haditha, Marine Corps Commandant, General Conway was riding in a MRAP when it became stuck on a concrete strip dividing two sides of a highway. After a delay, the driver was able to drive the length of the median to free the vehicle.
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Whereas the HMMWV was built with an off-road capability, the MRAP has no capability for off-road mobility except in the best of conditions. MRAPs poor off-road characteristics is due to its relative gargantuan weight. Bridges that used to be crossed by HMMWVs are no longer passable by MRAP. 
Conclusion
The Marine Corps needs to purchase a limited number of MRAP vehicles to deal with the immediate threat of IED. As decisions are made concerning future use and employment of the MRAP there are some considerations that must be weighed. The MRAP lacks the expeditionary capability of the rest of the Marine Corps.
The MRAP is not a replacement to the HMMWV as it has very limited mobility. The development of counters to the enemy's threat must be weighed against the enemy's ability to adapt his tactics to that counter. The MRAP acquisition should be thought of as a very limited capability that is for Iraq only and not something to be integrated into future expeditionary operations.
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